The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report, Volume 1Columbia Accident Investigation Board
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Final Report, Volume 1
In 1981, Columbia became the first spacecraft of its type to fly in Earth orbit and successfully completed 27 missions over more than two decades. During the STS-107 mission, Columbia and its crew traveled more than six million miles in 16 days. The Orbiterʼs destruction, just 16 minutes before scheduled touchdown, shows that space flight is still far from routine. It involves a substantial element of risk, which must be recognized, but never accepted with resignation. The seven Columbia astronauts believed that the risk was worth the reward. The Board salutes their courage and dedicates this report to their memory. - Summary by from the Board Report
Note: Volumes 2-6 are supporting documents and transcripts not included in this recording.
Audiolibros
38 capítulos
19 h 3 min
- 1 Cover Explanation, In Memoriam, Board Statement11:47
- 2 Executive Summary, Report Synopsis22:54
- 3 An Introduction to the Space Shuttle, An Introduction to NASA21:50
- 4 Pt 1: The Accident Ch 1: The Evolution of the Space Shuttle Program35:20
- 5 Ch 2a: Columbia's Final Flight, part 132:27
- 6 Ch 2b: Columbia's Final Flight, part 232:50
- 7 Ch 2c: Columbia's Final Flight, part 329:21
- 8 Mission Control Center Communications20:44
- 9 Ch 3a: Accident Analysis, part 128:15
- 10 Foam Fracture Under Hydrostatic Pressure9:34
- 11 Ch 3b: Accident Analysis, part 220:57
- 12 Ch 3c: Accident Analysis, part 329:55
- 13 Ch 3d: Accident Analysis, part 448:50
- 14 Ch 3e: Accident Analysis, part 529:51
- 15 Ch 3f: Accident Analysis, part 627:57
- 16 Ch 4a: Other Factors Considered, part 129:55
- 17 Ch 4b: Other Factors Considered, part 230:47
- 18 Pt 2: Why the Accident Occurred, Ch 5a: From Challenger to Columbia, part 141:13
- 19 Ch 5b: From Challenger to Columbia, part 234:13
- 20 Ch 5c: From Challenger to Columbia, part 337:41
- 21 Ch 6a: Decision Making at NASA, part 141:22
- 22 Ch 6b: Decision Making at NASA, part 227:14
- 23 Ch 6c: Decision Making at NASA, part 335:34
- 24 Ch 6d: Decision Making at NASA, part 424:20
- 25 Ch 6e: Decision Making at NASA, part 527:31
- 26 Ch 6f: Decision Making at NASA, part 627:05
- 27 Ch 6g: Decision Making at NASA, part 734:29
- 28 Ch 6h: Decision Making at NASA, part 836:50
- 29 Ch 6i: Decision Making at NASA, part 99:38
- 30 Ch 7a: The Accident's Organizational Causes, part 135:01
- 31 Ch 7b: The Accident's Organizational Causes, part 231:36
- 32 Ch 7c: The Accident's Organizational Causes, part 341:09
- 33 Ch 8a: History As Cause: Columbia and Challenger, part 128:46
- 34 Ch 8b: History As Cause: Columbia and Challenger, part 234:50
- 35 Pt 3: A Look Ahead, Ch 9: Implications for the Future of Human Space Flight35:02
- 36 Ch 10a: Other Significant Observations, part 133:07
- 37 Ch 10b: Other Significant Observations, part 249:47
- 38 Ch 11: Recommendations13:26